Thoughts on the Political Psychology of Compromise

Professor Thomas Berg (St. Thomas) posted a very thoughtful comment a few days ago on two pieces about same-sex marriage written respectively by Professors Michael Perry and Rick Garnett. I’ve reprinted my thoughts about Tom’s comment below, in case it is of interest to readers here.

Reading Tom’s thoughtful comment below is a pleasure. He takes each of Michael’s and Rick’s respective pieces, notes and elaborates on areas of agreement, and proceeds to explain with care where he may have a different view. I should also say that I very much respect and admire the work that he, Professor Laycock, Professor Wilson, Rick, and Michael (among others) have been doing on the issue of religious exemptions and same-sex marriage.

The tail end of Tom’s post caught my eye: “In fact, in the long run, I think, the best hope for arguing for religious liberty is not to refuse sympathy for gay couples’ efforts to live out their deep, pervasive commitments–but rather to accord them sympathy and claim similar sympathy for the deep, pervasive commitments of religious believers individually and in their institutions.  It is frequently argued that activists for SSM, “aggressive and uncompromising,” will never return that sympathy.  But the struggle here is, as in so many other cases, to convince those in the middle.  My own judgment is that as time goes on, the effort to refuse same-sex marriage will increasingly alienate those in the middle, forfeiting the chance to win them to a “live and let live” approach that will protect traditional religious organizations’ ability to maintain their identities.”

Here are a few friendly questions for Tom about this paragraph, offered up in an appreciative spirit. The overarching question is: Why is this your judgment? More specifically, what is the basis for the judgment that, as a predictive matter, a metaphorical cessation of hostilities on the substantive question of same-sex marriage will, as time goes on, result in a metaphorical cessation of hostilities on the substantive question of religious exemption? It seems to me that in order to reach that conclusion, one would have to believe certain other things, too–things which are not necessarily particular to this debate but may reflect more general beliefs about political psychology. It is those more general beliefs that I want to explore and think about in this post.

First, it seems to me that one would need to believe in a theory of what I’ll call sympathetic reciprocity in politics (the word “sympathy” appears several times in Tom’s comment), which might go something like this: in the realm of politics or policy-making, over the long-term, people remember and respect concessions, and they respond to those concessions with concessions of their own. They reward sympathy with sympathy. And eventually, with time and good faith, a people that holds radically different beliefs about the good life can achieve a modus vivendi–a ‘live and let live’ ethic–by observing a policy of sympathetic reciprocity.

Setting aside this particular controversy, though, I wonder whether that is an accurate description of the reasons that political concessions generally get made. We do not accept a ‘live and let live’ ethic for many issues of public concern; we do accept them for others; and the issues for which we do and do not accept such an ethic are relatively stable but always changing. But is the extent to which we accept such an ethic in turn dependent on a theory of sympathetic reciprocity–that is, on the extent to which those with whom we disagree have previously extended sympathy toward the policy that we champion and that they disavow? Does politics have a sympathetic memory in this way, and does it reward those who moderate their views with reciprocal concessions? Or is the acceptance of a ‘live and let live’ ethic more dependent on considerations of public salience, political prestige and influence, effective rhetoric, cost, the vagaries of public opinion, cultural trends–in sum, is it far more dependent on considerations of cultural and political power? I grant that this is a gloomier view than I think is at work in Tom’s comment. I’m not sure that I endorse it in an unqualified way. But I hope Tom might say a little bit more about why–on what grounds–he holds (or seems to hold) to the comparatively sunny view of sympathetic reciprocity in politics.

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Brague, “On the God of the Christians (And On One or Two Others)”

A few years ago, while working on an essay on Christian and Islamic jurisprudence, I read a translation of University of Paris philosopher Rémi Brague’s helpful book, The Law of God, a history of the concept of divine law in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. Brague is good at showing the essentially different understandings of law in these three great religious traditions. Last month, St. Augustine’s Press published a translation of an interesting-looking new book by Brague, On the God of the Christians (And On One or Two Others), which looks to cover some of the same material. The publisher’s description follows:

On the God of the Christians tries to explain how Christians conceive of the God whom they worship. No proof for His existence is offered, but simply a description of the Christian image of God.

The first step consists in doing away with some commonly held opinions that put them together with the other “monotheists,” “religions of the book,” and “religions of Abraham.”

Christians do believe in one God, but they do not conceive of its being one in the same way as other “monotheists,” like the first of them, the pharaoh Akhenaton (18th century before J.C.), like some philosophers, e.g., Aristotle, or like Islam.

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Pappé, “The Forgotten Palestinians”

This July, Yale University Press published The Forgotten Palestinians: A History of the Palestinians in Israel, written by Ilan Pappé (Exeter University).  The 9780300184327publisher’s description follows.

For more than 60 years, hundreds of thousands of Palestinians have lived as Israeli citizens within the borders of the nation formed at the end of the 1948 conflict. Occupying a precarious middle ground between the Jewish citizens of Israel and the dispossessed Palestinians of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, the Israeli Palestinians have developed an exceedingly complex relationship with the land they call home; however, in the innumerable discussions of the Israel-Palestine problem, their experiences are often overlooked and forgotten.

In this book, historian Ilan Pappé examines how Israeli Palestinians have fared under Jewish rule and what their lives tell us about both Israel’s attitude toward minorities and Palestinians’ attitudes toward the Jewish state. Drawing upon significant archival and interview material, Pappé analyzes the Israeli state’s policy towards its Palestinian citizens, finding discrimination in matters of housing, education, and civil rights. Rigorously researched yet highly readable, The Forgotten Palestinians brings a new and much-needed perspective to the Israel-Palestine debate.

Arab Christians in British Mandate Palestine: Communalism and Nationalism, 1917–1948

This April, Columbia University Press distributed Arab Christians in British Mandate Palestine: Communalism and Nationalism, 1917-1948 , written by appNoah Haiduc-Dale (Centenary College) and originally published by Edinburgh University Press.  The publisher’s description follows.

This volume focuses on the relationship between Arab Christians and the nationalist movement in Palestine as the British Mandate unfolded throughout the first half of the twentieth century (1917–1948). Its portrayal of individual behaviors and beliefs, including those of Christian organizations (both religious and social), undermine dominant historical paradigms envisioning Arab Christians as prone to communalism. Instead, this study shows they were as likely as their Muslim counterparts to support nationalism. When social pressure forced Christians to identify along communal lines, they did so in conjunction with a stronger dedication to nationalism. Challenging the standard historiography of communalism, which suggests communal identification is always in opposition to nationalist claims, Noah Haiduc-Dale refuses to stereotype Arab Christian behavior and belief by appreciating a range of Christian activities under the Mandate.