Posted on by Marc O. DeGirolami

Ahmed & Luk on Religious Arbitration and Autonomy

A new piece just published in the Oxford Journal of Law and Religion by Farrah Ahmed (Melbourne) and Senwung Luk (private practice), How Religious Arbitration Could Enhance Personal Autonomy.  Readers should be put in mind of the excellent papers and posts by our former guest, Michael Helfand, as well as the work of colloquium presenter and CLR friend Ayelet Shachar.  The abstract follows.

The public debate on religious arbitration often assumes that certain liberal autonomy-based arguments against state recognition of religious arbitration in family law matters are conclusive, ie that religious arbitration necessarily harms personal autonomy. This article challenges that assumption and highlights the autonomy-enhancing potential of religious arbitration. We argue that the state recognition of religious arbitration has the potential to enhance autonomy by facilitating the option of religious practice. We argue that religious arbitration has the potential to enhance the autonomy of religious persons by providing them access to religious expertise. Finally, we indicate how the recognition of religious arbitration protects the autonomy of some by keeping them from a possible autonomy-diminishing alternative.

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Patrick on Theocratic Constitutionalism

Jeremy Patrick (University of Southern Queensland School of Law) has posted Religion and New Constitutions: Recent Trends of Harmony and Divergence. The abstract follows.

The explicit incorporation of Islamic principles in the constitutions of Iraq and Afghanistan has highlighted concern over the past decade that theocratic constitutionalism has become a rival to traditional liberal constitutionalism. Whereas liberal constitutionalism ascribes religion special value but places it in the sphere of the private through guarantees of religious freedom, equal protection of religion, and non-establishment, the emerging ideology of theocratic constitutionalism holds the potential to redefine all rights through the lens of a particular religion.

This Article is an empirical study of whether, and to what degree, liberal constitutionalism has been supplanted by theocratic constitutionalism. Every constitution enacted since the year 2000 has been examined, and its provisions relating to religion sorted into the following categories: Preambular, Ceremonial Deism, Established Religion, Freedom of Religion, Equal Protection of Religion, and (non-)Establishment Clause. Analysis of the prevalence of these categories in new constitutions demonstrates that most new constitutions display some evidence of both liberal and theocratic constitutionalism.

Posted on by Mark Movsesian

Kar on the Eastern Origins of Western Law

Robin Kar (Illinois) is doing a series of articles that takes issue, among other things, with parts of the Berman thesis I mentioned yesterday in my post on John McGinnis. Here is the abstract for the second in the series, On the Early Eastern Origins of Western Law and Western Civilization: New Arguments for a Changed Understanding of Our Earliest Legal and Cultural Origins (Part 2):

Western law and Western civilization are often said to be parts of a distinctive tradition, which differentiates them from their counterparts in the “East” and explains many of their special capacities and characteristics. One common version of this story, as propounded by the influential legal scholar Harold Berman, asserts that Western civilization (including its incipient legal traditions) began in the 11th century AD with a return to the texts of three more primordial traditions: those of ancient Greece, Rome, and Israel. The basic story that Western civilization finds its origins in ancient Greek, Roman, and Hebrew culture is, however, so familiar and so pervasive that it has rarely — until recently — been questioned in the West.

This Article develops a novel set of arguments, rooted in recent findings from a broad range of cognate fields, to suggest that this standard story is nevertheless incomplete and even potentially misleading. If we are genuinely interested in understanding our origins in a way that will shed light on why the West has exhibited such distinctive capacities for large-scale human civilization and the rule of law, then the story we commonly tell ourselves starts abruptly in the middle and leaves out some of the most formative (and potentially transformative) dimensions of the truth. Western law and Read more

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Resnicoff on Jewish Law and the Tragedy of Sexual Abuse of Children

Steven H. Resnicoff  (DePaul U. School of Law) has posted Jewish Law and the Tragedy of Sexual Abuse of Children: The Dilemma within the Orthodox Jewish Community. The abstract follows.

Jewish law requires a person to exert one’s energies and expend one’s financial resources to prevent the commission of interpersonal crimes and to protect or rescue victims of such crime. By contrast, American law generally permits a person to watch another bleed to death without offering any assistance at all. Most Jewish law courses place great emphasis on this difference, and commentators frequently cite it as proof of Jewish law’s moral superiority.

However, with respect to the tragedy of child sexual abuse, the systems seem to have switched roles. American law imposes a variety of affirmative duties on individuals and organizations to protect prospective victims. These obligations include conducting fingerprint-based criminal background checks on employees and reporting reasonably suspected or reasonably believed child abuse to public authorities.

By contrast, with respect to child sexual abuse, many, although certainly not all, important Orthodox authorities have rejected the ameliorative steps prescribed by secular law. Even more troublingly, they have permitted, and in at least some cases possibly encouraged, reprisals against those who have reported abuse, including victims and their families.

I argue that the problem does not lie in Jewish law. After thoroughly examining the relevant Jewish law doctrines, I conclude that Jewish law not only permits but actually demands that vigorous measures be taken to eradicate child sexual abuse. However, I also acknowledge that the sociological realities of the Orthodox Jewish community seem to have produced a variety of pressures that help perpetuate the status quo. Such factors include conscious or subconscious concerns for the financial viability of important communal institutions and for the community members’ continued fealty to traditional rabbinic authorities. However, I argue that even these concerns could be more successfully addressed if rabbinic authorities would spearhead steps to stamp out child sexual abuse.

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Zelinsky on Religious Tax Exemptions and Entanglement

Edward A. Zelinsky (Cardozo School of Law) has posted Do Religious Tax Exemptions Entangle in Violation of the Establishment Clause? The Constitutionality of the Parsonage Allowance Exclusion and the Religious Exemptions of the Individual Health Care Mandate and the Fica and Self-Employment Taxes. The abstract follows.

In Freedom From Religion Foundation v. Geithner, the Freedom From Religion Foundation (FFRF) argues that Code Section 107 and the income tax exclusion that section grants to “minister[s] of the gospel” for parsonage allowances violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. This case has important implications for a new federal law mandating that individuals maintain “minimum essential” health care coverage for themselves and their dependents. That mandate contains two religious exemptions. One of these exemptions incorporates a pre-existing religious exemption from the federal self-employment tax. These sectarian exemptions raise the same First Amendment issues as does the Code’s exclusion from gross income of clerical housing allowances.

I ultimately find unpersuasive the indictment of Section 107 as constitutionally entangling. For the same reasons, I also conclude that the religious exemptions of the Social Security taxes and of the individual health mandate pass First Amendment muster. In the modern world, extensive contact between tax systems and religious institutions is unavoidable. Whether religious entities and actors are taxed or exempted, there are inevitable tensions between the contemporary state and sectarian institutions and their personnel. Whether religious entities and actors are taxed or exempted, there are no disentangling alternatives, just imperfect trade-offs between different forms of entanglement.

Thus, Section 107 and the exclusion from gross income it grants to clerical recipients of housing and parsonage allowances are constitutionally permitted, though not constitutionally required, responses to the problems of entanglement inherent in the relationship between modern government and religion. Similarly, the Code’s sectarian exemptions from the individual health care mandate and from the FICA and self-employment taxes are acceptable, though not obligatory, means under the First Amendment of managing the inevitable contacts and tensions between the contemporary state and the religious community.

However, as a matter of tax policy, the exclusion of Section 107(2) for cash parsonage allowances stands on weaker ground than does the exclusion of Section 107(1) for in-kind housing provided to “minister[s] of the gospel.” The taxation of such cash allowances, in contrast to the taxation of housing provided in-kind, does not involve problems of valuation or of taxpayer liquidity and is thus more practicable as a matter of tax policy.

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Waldron on Natural Law

Jeremy Waldron  (NYU School of Law) has posted What is Natural Law Like? The abstract follows.

“The State of Nature,” said John Locke, “has a Law of Nature to govern it, which obliges every one.” But what is “a law of nature”? How would we tell, in a state of nature, that there was a natural law as opposed to something else — like positive law, a set of customs, natural morality, natural ethics, a set of natural inclinations, the truth of certain prudential calculations, a widespread but perhaps false belief in some transcendent law, the voice of God, or just a natural disposition on the part of some pompous people to make sonorous objective-sounding pronouncements? What form should we expect natural law to take in our apprehension of it? This paper argues three things. (a) John Finnis’s work on natural law provides no answer to these questions; his “theory of natural law” is really just a theory of the necessary basis in ethics for evaluating positive law. (b) We need an answer to the question “What is natural law like” not just to evaluate the work of state-of-nature theorists like Locke, but also to explore the possibility that natural law might once have played the role now played by positive international law in regulating relations between sovereigns. And (c), an affirmative account of what natural law is like must pay attention to (1) its deontic character; (2) its enforceability; (3) the ancillary principles that have to be associated with its main normative requirements if it is to be operate as a system of law; (4) its separability form objective from ethics and morality, even from objective ethics and morality; and (5) the shared recognition on earth of its presence in the world. Some of these points — especially 3, 4, and 5 — sound like characteristics of positive law. But the paper argues that they are necessary nevertheless if it is going to be plausible to say that natural law has ever operated (or does still operate) as law in the world.

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Redding on What American Legal Theory Might Learn from Islamic Law

Jeff Redding (Saint Louis U. School of Law) has posted What American Legal Theory Might Learn from Islamic Law: Some Lessons About ‘The Rule of Law’ from ‘Shari‘a Court’ Practice in India. The abstract follows.

In 2010, voters in the state of Oklahoma passed a constitutional amendment that prohibits the Oklahoma courts from considering “Sharia Law.” A great deal of the support for this amendment and similar (ongoing) legal initiatives appears to be generated by a deep-seated paranoia about Muslims and Islamic law that has taken root in many parts of the post-9/11 United States. This Article contends that the passage of this Oklahoma constitutional amendment should not have been surprising given that it is not only right-wing partisans who have felt the need to strictly demarcate and police the boundaries of the American legal system, but also liberal partisans too. Indeed, this Article argues that certain modes of American liberal legal thought actually facilitate the anti-shari‘a mania currently sweeping the United States. As a result, an adequate response to this mania cannot simply rely on traditional, American-style, liberal legal theorizing. Indeed, as this Article argues and explains, some extant American liberal understandings of ‘law,’ ‘legal systems,’ and ‘the rule of law’ are eminently inappropriate resources in the struggle against American forms of reactionary parochialism because these liberal understandings are themselves deeply compromised by their own forms of parochialism.

This state of theoretical affairs is unfortunate. As a result, in the course of demonstrating some of the theoretical inadequacies of American liberal legalism, this Article also commences an alternative theorization about ‘law,’ ‘legal systems’ and, more particularly, ‘the rule of law.’ This theorization relies heavily on what can be learned about ‘the rule of law’ — including whatever exists of it in the United States — from the experiences of an Indian Muslim woman, ‘Ayesha,’ who recently used a non-state ‘shari‘a court’ (specifically, a ‘dar ul qaza’) in Delhi to exercise her Indian Islamic divorce rights. I recently interviewed Ayesha at length as part of a larger project on liberalism and Islamophobia.

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Weinstein on RLUIPA’s Effect on Local Governments

Alan C. Weinstein (Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, Cleveland State University) has posted The Effect of RLUIPA’s Land Use Provisions on Local Governments. The abstract follows.

In the absence of perfect information about how RLUIPA has affected local governments, this article argues that the courts have adopted a pragmatic approach to maneuvering in the difficult terrain that RLUIPA occupies: combining appropriate judicial deference to a legislature that enacts a neutral law of general applicability with the heightened judicial scrutiny that becomes appropriate when that same law is applied to a specific zoning approval, a circumstance that frequently allows for subjectivity, and thus the potential for discrimination or arbitrariness against religious uses, in the approval process. I conclude that: (1) until proven otherwise, the costs RLUIPA undoubtedly imposes on local governments is the price to be paid for insuring against the discriminatory or arbitrary application of land use regulations and (2) RLUIPA does not seek to establish an unconstitutional preference for religious uses, but rather a proper accommodation of religious exercise in the land use context.

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Wright on Neutrality in Religion Clause Cases

R. George Wright (Indiana University Robert H. McKinney School of Law) has posted Can We Make Sense of ‘Neutrality’ in the Religion Clause Cases?: Seven Rescue Attempts, and a Viable Alternative. The abstract follows.

This Article addresses the controversial question of ‘neutrality’ as a crucial test in a number of important Religion Clause cases. The idea of ‘neutrality’ in the Religion Clause context turns out to be popular, but unavoidably incoherent.

The Article then explores seven alternative approaches to explaining why Religion Clause neutrality tests persist, despite the evident incoherence of the concept of neutrality. None of these seven alternatives, however, holds much promise for a valuable re-interpretation or rescue of the idea of neutrality.

What is needed is not a re-interpretation of Religion Clause neutrality tests, but a replacement for such tests. The Conclusion offers coherent and useful guidance in addressing many Religion Clause cases, based on a surprising adaptation of elements from the apparently remote area of Takings Clause and police power regulation jurisprudence.

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Ali on Women’s Rights in Pakistan

Shaheen S. Ali has posted Overlapping Discursive Terrains of Culture, Law and Women’s Rights: An Exploratory Study on Legal Pluralism at Play in Pakistan. The abstract follows.

This paper argues that plural regulatory frameworks (‘laws’ broadly defined) including religion, culture, customs, tradition as well as ‘formal’ law (national and international) informing women’s human rights, collude to create and perpetuate gender hierarchies. Whilst ‘informal’ norms of culture, custom and tradition expressly advance this position, gender neutral laws adopted by the state and her institutions are suspect, as these too, operate within a male socio-legal and political environment. Using the example of Pakistan, the paper attempts to present the contours of an analytical framework for mounting a challenge to plural legal systems from the perspective of women’s lived experiences and realities of their being.