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Garnett on Religious Discrimination

Richard W. Garnett (Notre Dame Law School) has posted Religious Freedom and the Nondiscrimination Norm. The abstract follows.

“Discrimination,” we believe, is wrong. And, because “discrimination” is wrong, we believe that governments like ours – secular, liberal, constitutional governments – may, and should, take regulatory and other steps to prevent, discourage, and denounce it. However, it is not true that “discrimination” is always or necessarily wrong. Nor is it the case that governments always or necessarily should or may regulate or discourage it even when it is. Some wrongs are beyond the authorized reach of government policy; some are too difficult or costly to identify, let alone regulate; others are none of the government’s business.

When we say that “discrimination” is wrong, what we actually mean is that wrongful discrimination is wrong, and when we affirm that governments should oppose it we mean that governments should oppose it when it makes sense, all things considered, and when it is within their constitutionally and morally limited powers to do so. To label a decision or action “discrimination” is simply to note that one factor or another was or will be taken into account in the course of a decision; it is to invite, but not at all to answer, the questions whether that decision or action was or would be wrong, and whether the public authority may or should forbid or discourage it.
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Augustine & Augustine on Religion, Race and the Fourth Estate

Jonathan C. Augustine (United Theological Seminary) and Roslyn Satchel Augustine have posted Religion, Race and the Fourth Estate: Xenophobia in the Media Ten Years after 9/11. The abstract follows.

September 11, 2011 marked the tenth anniversary of the most horrific attacks in the United States. In the decade after the September 11, 2001 attacks (9/11), matters of race and religion maintained an awkwardly prominent role in American culture, with the media arguably fueling perceptions. This interdisciplinary Article’s thesis is that media elites, most of which are large corporations, threaten American democracy with xenophobic influence in an age of unmediated communication. Thus, the frequent imagery of “us” versus “them” has exasperated religious tensions between Judeo-Christian faith groups and religious minorities.

In the wake of the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, corporate media entities are now able to control the news and the newsmaker, with free speech that has become very costly. Indeed, empirical studies and research show that media has misused its trusted status as the proverbial “fourth branch of government,” because of capitalism and consumerism. Moreover, in an effort to increase ratings and associated advertising dollars, media has reinforced stereotypes by marketing and essentially selling fear as part of the War on Terror. The authors seek to prove their thesis by emphasizing the historical significance of the First Amendment’s individual protections, examining deregulation and the media’s profit-making interests, and criticizing the Citizens United decision as creating an inherent conflict of interest for media corporations, considering their proven interest in “selling” news for pecuniary gain.

Posted on by Mark Movsesian

Temperman on Extreme Speech

Jeroen Temperman (Erasmus University Rotterdam) has posted a new piece on SSRN, Freedom of Expression and Religious Sensitivities in Pluralist Societies: Facing the Challenge of Extreme Speech. The abstact follows.

Within the European Convention system, judgments have supported legal restrictions on hate speech, but also on blasphemy or religious defamation. The universal human rights instruments, particularly the ICCPR, are increasingly geared towards eradicating hate speech (speech that threatens the rights and freedoms of others), whilst forms of extreme speech that fall short of that category are to be protected rather than countered by states. The Human Rights Committee’s recently adopted General Comment (No. 34) on freedom of expression, provides another strong indication that this is the envisaged way forward: repealing blasphemy and defamation bills, whilst simultaneously increasing the efforts to combat hate speech. This paper argues that it remains ever so important to continue taking stock of the legal justifications for restrictions that are suggested in this area and to scrutinize whether they are in fact sustainable from a human rights perspective –– not only on paper, but also in actual practice. The paper compares and contrasts the universal monitoring bodies’ approach to extreme speech with that of regional monitoring bodies, notably the European Court of Human Rights.

Posted on by Mark Movsesian

Goldenziel on Courts in Majority-Muslim Countries

In the conflict between Islamists and secularists in majority-Muslim countries, courts can play a major role. Yesterday, for example,  Egypt’s Supreme Constitutional Court issued rulings allowing a former Mubarak loyalist to run for president and effectively dissolving the country’s Islamist-dominated parliament — clear victories for executive power and supporters of the old regime. A new piece by Jill Goldenziel (Harvard), Veiled Political Questions: Islamic Dress, Constitutionalism, and the Ascendance of Courts, suggests that the situation is more complicated, however. Courts in majority-Muslim countries do not always side with executive power. Even in Egypt, there are tensions between the SCC, which the Mubarak regime brought to heel, and the High Administrative Court, which remained more independent.  Her piece makes for interesting reading. The abstract follows.

This article explains how judicial independence can develop in regimes that are not fully democratic. Conventional wisdom holds that a strong legislature and political parties are necessary for the emergence of an independent judiciary. This article challenges conventional wisdom by explaining how judicial independence may arise in regimes where these conditions are not present. It presents a theory of how judicial independence emerges and why and when other political actors will respect it. The article also explains why courts may be better poised than legislatures to counter executive power in non-democracies. The theory is developed through a discussion of cases involving Islamic headscarves and veils in Middle Eastern courts. These cases have broad political implications because Read more

Posted on by Mark Movsesian

Merin on Religious Marriage in Israel

Yuval Merin (COMAS) has posted a new article on SSRN, Recognizing Foreign Marriages of Couples Ineligible for Religious Marriage in Israel–A New Perspective of Choice of Law and Public Policy (in Hebrew). The abstract follows.

The Israeli laws of marriage and divorce are governed exclusively by religious law. Several groups of the Israeli population are completely excluded from the institution of marriage due to a long list of religious restrictions and impediments. Couples ineligible for religious marriage include persons “disqualified for religious marriage”; interfaith couples; persons without a recognized religion; and same-sex couples.

Such couples can only marry abroad. Upon their return to Israel, they may register as “married” in the Population Registry and may enjoy a few of the rights associated with the institution, but their marriages are unrecognized for most other purposes. Since the field of marriage recognition is not regulated under Israeli positive law, the courts will have to decide whether to apply the English personal law system or the American principle of lex loci celebrationis. A critical comparison between the two competing systems reveals that the American rule is preferable since it best promotes the policy objectives which choice of law rules in the field of marriage recognition should seek to achieve. It is also preferable since it best corresponds to the unique social and legal conditions prevalent in the State of Israel. Foreign marriages performed by Israeli couples ineligible for religious marriage (valid in the place of celebration) should thus be recognized, subject to the public policy exception. Religious norms, which are exclusively applied in matters of marriage and divorce within Israel, should not be considered in the framing of the public policy exception, which should be interpreted narrowly, as protecting only democratic, secular, rational and liberal values. Thus, the foreign marriages of couples who are single, adult, and unrelated to one another, and whose marriage in Israel is prohibited due to purely religious restrictions, should be fully recognized under Israeli private international law.

Posted on by Mark Movsesian

Van Kempen on Freedom of Religion and Criminal Law

Piet Hein Van Kempen (Radboud University Nijmegen) has posted a new piece on SSRN, Freedom of Religion and Criminal Law: A Legal Appraisal–From the Principle of Separation of Church and State to the Principle of Pluralist Democracy?. The abstract follows.

This paper discusses how criminal law and religion should or should not be involved with each other from the point of view of the right to freedom of religion. With that in mind the paper addresses several interrelated questions. What does the principle of separation of church and state require, what interests does it serve, and does it allow for criminal law measures that are explicitly concerned with matters of religion or belief? What does the human right to freedom of religion in general imply about the relation between state and religion? To what extend does the right to freedom of religion oppose, allow or require criminal law measures that deal explicitly with religion or belief? Issues discussed here are e.g. blasphemy, apostasy, an proselytism. And finally: is the principle of pluralist democracy better suited to regulating the relation between the state and religion when it comes to criminal law than the separation principle? As regards the analyses of international human rights law, the emphasis of this contribution is the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR, 1966) and the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR, 1950). The 1981 UN Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief (the 1981 UN Declaration), the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR, 1969), and the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights (AfChHPR, 1981) will be considered insofar as these instruments or the jurisprudence based thereon provide relevant direction on the issues under discussion.

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Rahdert on Trends in Taxpayer Standing to Challenge the Establishment Clause

Mark Rahdert (Temple University – James E. Beasley School of Law) has posted Court Reform and Breathing Space Under the Establishment Clause. The abstract follows.  

Flast v. Cohen held that federal taxpayers have standing to challenge government spending for religion. While Frothingham v. Mellon generally prohibits taxpayer standing in federal courts, the Court reasoned that the Establishment Clause specifically prohibits taxation in any amount to fund unconstitutional religious spending. For several decades Flast has been settled law that supplied jurisdiction in many leading establishment cases. But Hein v. Freedom from ReligionFoundation, Inc. and Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization v. Winn signal that Flast may soon be overruled. This jurisdictional ferment raises two questions: Why this sudden shift? And what does it signify for the Establishment Clause?
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Mughal on Islamic Human Rights

Munir Ahmad Mughal (Punjab University Law College; Superior Law College; LIMIT Law College, Lahore) has posted Islamic Concepts of Human Rights. The abstract follows.

This paper deals with the Islamic concept of Human Rights with special reference to its application in Pakistan. It is heartening that the United Nations Organization is taking all such steps which are enunciated by Islam for the betterment and welfare of mankind and its dignity.

In this paper, judgements of Supreme Court of Pakistan, Federal Shariat Court and High Courts of all the provinces have also been added for facilitation of further research by all those who are interested to work for the human rights and the fundamental rights.
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Ching on Bonhoeffer, Church, and State

Kenneth Ching  (Regent U. School of Law ) has posted Would Jesus Kill Hitler? Bonhoeffer, Church, and State. The abstract follows.

“Would Jesus kill Hitler?” is a symbolic question about the relationship between church and state. Jesus, of course, did not have occasion to answer. But Dietrich Bonhoeffer did. Bonhoeffer was a pastor, theologian, and philosopher who, while trying to “live the life of Jesus,” conspired to assassinate Hitler.

This will be the first law journal article to take Bonhoeffer as its primary subject. The article summarizes a long tradition of Christian political theory, the natural law/two kingdoms (“NL2K”) tradition. The NL2K tradition runs through St. Augustine, William of Ockham, Martin Luther, John Calvin, and many others. Some argue that Bonhoeffer rejected this tradition. This article’s descriptive thesis is that Bonhoeffer was part of the NL2K tradition. Also, a problem in the tradition is identified. Sometimes, the church has had too much influence on the state (theocratic Geneva and Puritan Massachusetts); sometimes, it has had too little (the antebellum South and Nazi Germany).

This article describes and assesses Bonhoeffer’s developments of and deviations from the NL2K tradition both theoretically and in the context of his opposition to Hitler and the Nazis. Using Bonhoeffer, this article also offers an answer to the problematic question “how much influence should the church have on the state?” The normative thesis of this article is that the state must remain religiously neutral, but the church must oppose a state that acts illegitimately.

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Calo on Faithful Presence and Theological Jurisprudence

Zachary R. Calo  (Valparaiso U. School of Law) has posted Faithful Presence and Theological Jurisprudence: A Response to James Davison Hunter. The abstract follows.

This paper considers how James Hunter’s arguments, presented both in his address and his book To Change the World, might inform the development of a constructive religious legal theory based in the particular resources of Christian theology. In speaking of religious legal theory, I mean something quite different than a theory of law and religion. For some time, the academic conversation about law and religion has centered around issues concerning church-state relations and, more broadly, the place of religion within the liberal political order. Yet, the regnant methodological concerns that have shaped this discourse reflect the boundedness of law to a modern secular imaginary. This being the case, pulling theology into deeper conversation with legal thought will require freeing law from its lingering state of captivity. Hunter’s work is particularly useful in this ground-clearing task because it offers a dense critique of the sociological assumptions that have shaped legal modernity. While his concern is not with religious legal theory as such, Hunter’s normative account of Christian being in the world, captured most fully in the idea of faithful presence, contains important resources for developing a model of Christian engagement with law.