On the Oklahoma Charter School Decision

Earlier this week, in a much-watched case, the Oklahoma Supreme Court ruled that a charter school, St. Isidore of Seville, is unconstitutional under state and federal law. In a post at the Volokh site today, I argue that this ruling was probably correct. As a charter school, St. Isidore is a hybrid, a cross between a public and a private school, and that makes its legal position complicated. Here’s an excerpt:

It’s not quite as clear as the Oklahoma court makes it seem, but the decision is probably correct, at least respecting the federal constitutional claims. Legally speaking, St. Isidore is caught in a dilemma—a dilemma that its hybrid nature as a charter school creates. If St. Isidore qualifies as a public school, there’s an obvious Establishment Clause problem. St. Isidore argued that it shouldn’t be seen as a public school, but as an independent contractor. But the Oklahoma statute specifically provides that charter schools are “public.” And that’s not just a matter of form, but also substance. As a charter school, St. Isidore is funded entirely by the state, must take all students who apply, and must comply with curricular and other requirements that don’t apply to private schools.

On the other hand, if St. Isidore is a private actor, the US Supreme Court’s recent free exercise cases may not help it too much. In Carson and Espinoza, the Court ruled that the state cannot exclude private religious schools from tuition assistance programs simply because they are religious—that would violate the schools’ right to practice their religion. That seems correct to me. But in those cases, the Court stressed that public funds went to private schools through the filter of parental choice. Parents who received tuition assistance designated which schools would receive the money.

St. Isidore would be entirely free, by contrast, and Oklahoma would be funding the school directly. True, the amount of money St. Isidore would receive would depend, presumably, on the number of students it enrolled—and that would depend on parental choice. But the state is more in the foreground (and the parents more in the background) in this case than in either Carson or Espinoza, and it feels different, somehow.

You can read the whole post here.

On Law & Ritual in Hasidic Judaism

This one is a little outside my wheelhouse, but it looks quite interesting. Hasidic Judaism is known for its ecstatic approach. And yet, ironically, it is also one of Judaism’s most traditional expressions, with a serious focus on religious law. What explains this paradox? A new book from Stanford University Press, Laws of the Spirit: Ritual, Mysticism, and the Commandments in Early Hasidism, argues (if I understand it right) that Hasidism sees law as a matter of ritual rather than rules for worshippers to work out and follow. Of course, ritual is important in most religions, and in secular law as well, and I wonder if these insights could in some way apply in other contexts, too. The author is religious studies scholar Ariel Mayse (Stanford). Here’s the publisher’s description:

The compelling vision of religious life and practice found in Hasidic sources has made it the most enduring and successful Jewish movement of spiritual renewal of all time. In this book, Ariel Evan Mayse grapples with one of Hasidism’s most vexing questions: how did a religious movement known for its radical views about immanence, revelation, and the imperative to serve God with joy simultaneously produce strict adherence to the structures and obligations of Jewish law? Exploring the movement from its emergence in the mid-1700s until 1815, Mayse argues that the exceptionality of Hasidism lies not in whether its leaders broke or upheld rabbinic norms, but in the movement’s vivid attempt to rethink the purpose of Jewish ritual and practice. Rather than focusing on the commandments as law, he turns to the methods and vocabulary of ritual studies as a more productive way to reckon with the contradictions and tensions of this religious movement as well as its remarkable intellectual vitality.

Mayse examines the full range of Hasidic texts from the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, from homilies and theological treatises to hagiography, letters, and legal writings, reading them together with contemporary theories of ritual. Arguing against the notion that spiritual integrity requires unshackling oneself from tradition, Laws of the Spirit is a sweeping attempt to rethink the meaning and significance of religious practice in early Hasidism.

Legal Spirits 060: Memorial Day, the Knights of Columbus, and the National Park Service

Poplar Grove National Cemetery, Petersburg, Virginia

In this episode, Center Director Mark Movsesian interviews religion journalist Kelsey Dallas about the controversy that arose last month when the National Park Service refused to allow the Knights of Columbus to celebrate an annual Memorial Day Mass at a national cemetery in Virginia. The Park Service said it was enforcing the rules against “demonstrations”; the Knights said the refusal violated the group’s religious freedom. Who was right? And what does this controversy reveal about church-state relations in an increasingly secular America? Listen in!

Around the Web

Here are some important law-and-religion stories from around the web:

  • In French v. Albany Medical Center, the Northern District of New York found that a hospital did not violate the religious rights of a nurse who refused to receive a flu shot on religious grounds. The Court held that the requested accommodation was not reasonable due to her proximity to flu patients and vulnerable individuals.
  • In Bacon v. Woodward, the Ninth Circuit reversed the dismissal of a suit by firefighters who claimed their free exercise rights were infringed by the City of Spokane’s refusal to accommodate their religious objections to the COVID-19 vaccine. The Court held that the city’s termination of the plaintiffs while inviting potentially unvaccinated firefighters from neighboring departments for assistance constituted more favorable treatment for a secular group.
  • In Blackmon v. State of Missouri, a Missouri trial court held that the references to God and the belief that life starts at conception do not translate into various pro-life statutes running afoul of the Establishment Clause. The Court likened the mention of God to that found in the State’s Constitution, and refused to consider the latter belief as religious.
  • In Russia, a self-proclaimed witch was detained in court after disseminating literature calling for violence against clergy of the Russian Orthodox Church. She was also charged with insulting the feelings of religious believers as well as distributing extremist literature.
  • In Pakistan, a Christian man was killed by a mob of hundreds of individuals after being accused of desecrating a Quran. The United States Center for International Religious Freedom claims that the attack was inspired by Pakistan’s blasphemy laws, which explicitly provide for the death penalty upon anyone found to insult the Islamic faith.

A New Book on Christianity and Law

Christianity has a complicated relationship to law. Unlike Judaism and Islam, which are nomocentric religions, Christianity doesn’t have a law per se. Believers don’t worship God primarily by discovering and following a system of divinely ordained rules. There is no Christian “law” of inheritance, for example, that directs beneficiaries how to divide up property. But Christianity doesn’t entirely reject law. The Catholic tradition, in particular, places emphasis on natural law as a rational system–an emphasis that Orthodox and Protestants view with great suspicion. As I say, it’s complicated.

When it comes to the relationship between Christianity and civil law, things are complex as well. The Bible teaches Christians to give Caesar his due, but not more than that–to comply with civil law, but not if that means violating God’s law. Where to draw the line, especially in a contemporary, religiously pluralistic society, is often debatable.

A new book by Australian law professor Benjamin Saunders (Deakin University), The Crisis of Civil Law: What the Bible Teaches about Law and What It Means Today, addresses these complications. The publisher is Lexham Press. Looks very interesting. Here is the description from the publisher’s website:

How should Christians think about law?

In every age, this is one of the most difficult questions faced by followers of Christ. Within the modern church, there is little unity on how Scripture addresses issues like gun control, abortion, and whether we should disobey unjust laws. In The Crisis of Civil Law, legal scholar Benjamin B. Saunders draws from Scripture and the Christian tradition to provide valuable guidance on contemporary legal questions and the role of civil government. We can gain greater clarity by wisely applying the moral law found in Scripture—as well as the universal standards of the natural law—to the changing circumstances of human societies.

The Crisis of Civil Law includes detailed discussion of the biblical material on law as well as practical case studies that contextualize scriptural principles in modern Western society.

Around the Web:

Here are some important law-and-religion news stories from around the web this week:

  • In Woolard v. Thurmond, a California federal court upheld the requirement that state funds for home school programs be used only for secular instructional materials. The court ruled that this policy does not infringe on parents’ free exercise of religion, as states are permitted to provide strictly secular education in public schools.
  • In Freedom From Religion Foundation, Inc. v. Abbott, a Texas federal court ordered the state to pay $346,500 in attorneys’ fees to the Freedom From Religion Foundation in connection with litigation over Texas’s removing FFRF’s Bill of Rights Nativity display from the State Capitol in 2015.
  • In Aldersgate United Methodist Church of Montgomery v. Alabama-West Florida Conference of the United Methodist Church, Inc., the Alabama Supreme Court dismissed a lawsuit from 44 Methodist congregations trying to disaffiliate from the church’s main body but still keep their property. The court applied the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine, ruling that deciding the case would require it to interpret church doctrine and internal rules, which is prohibited by the First Amendment.
  • The U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops and others filed a lawsuit against the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission challenging the inclusion of abortion as a covered medical condition in the Pregnant Workers Fairness Act. The plaintiffs argue this inclusion and the nullification of the Act’s religious exemption will force employers to support abortion.
  • Ohio’s Attorney General filed a lawsuit to prevent Hebrew Union College from selling off its valuable Judaica library collection to address a financial deficit. The lawsuit alleges the college is violating state law by not disclosing the sale to donors and by breaching fiduciary duties by not preserving the collection according to donor intent.

Teaching American Religious History

Here at the Mattone Center, we focus on the study of law-and-religion, that is, the relationship between these two social institutions. Mostly, we emphasize the “law” part. But from the beginning we have tried to pay attention as well to religion as a subject in itself, especially to the history of religion in the West generally and the United States particularly. In my law-and-religion seminar, for example, I spend significant time on American religious history, much of which students are learning for the first time. I believe the material is essential. Without a knowledge of our religious history, it’s difficult to understand why our law with respect to religion has developed as it has.

A book out this month from the University of Wisconsin Press, Understanding and Teaching Religion in US History, seems a very good resource for instructors getting into this material. The editors are historian Karen J. Johnson (Wheaton College) and religious studies scholar Jonathan M. Yeager (University of Tennessee at Chattanooga). Here’s the description from the publisher’s website:

How to learn, think, and teach about a vital and sometimes contentious topic

Religion is deeply embedded in American history, and one cannot understand American history’s broad dynamics without accounting for it. Without detailing the history of religions, teachers cannot properly explain key themes in US survey courses, such as politics, social dynamics, immigration and colonization, gender, race, or class. From early Native American beliefs and practices, to European explorations of the New World, to the most recent presidential elections, religion has been a significant feature of the American story. In Understanding and Teaching Religion in US History, a diverse group of eminent historians and history teachers provide a practical tool for teachers looking to improve history instruction at the upper-level secondary and undergraduate level.

This book offers a breadth of voices and approaches to teaching this crucial part of US history. Religion can be a delicate topic, especially in public education, and many students and teachers bring strongly held views and identities to their understanding of the past. The editors and contributors aim to help the reader see religion in fresh ways, to present sources and perspectives that may be unfamiliar, and to suggest practical interventions in the classroom that teachers can use immediately.

Around the Web

Here’s some important law-and-religion news stories from around the web:

  • In Carter v. Local 556, Transport Union Workers of America, the Fifth Circuit stayed an order by a Texas District Court ordering attorneys to attend 8 hours of religious liberty training by a Christian non-profit. The attorneys were responsible for firing an employee after she espoused religiously-motivated pro-life content on her personal social media accounts.
  • Three Jewish students of UCLA sued the university for failing to protect its Jewish student population from campus unrest and discrimination in violation of federal law. The complaint alleges that Jewish students have been effectively banned from large segments of the campus informally called the “Jewish Exclusionary Zone”, and that the university has failed to act in the face of widespread antisemitism.
  • In St. Mary’s Catholic Parish in Littleton v. Roy, a District Court in Colorado ruled that the State could not refuse to exempt faith-based preschools from complying with a policy against discrimination on the basis of sexual identity while also allowing congregational-based preschools to prefer their own members. The Court criticized the policy for effectively allowing preschools to discriminate based on church membership, while simultaneously failing to allow these same schools to dictate their own admission standards.
  • A Vermont couple filed suit against the state over a policy that mandated all foster parents unconditionally demonstrate their ability to assent to a child’s potential desire to dress, cut their hair, or act in any way according to their stated gender identity. The couple claimed that the policy violated their Free Speech and Religious Liberty Rights by forcing them to act and speak in a way inconsistent with their beliefs.
  • In Oklahoma, the State Legislature has enacted a bill requiring schools to offer a released-time course dedicated to religious teaching and moral instruction for up to three class-periods per week. The courses would be taught by an independent entity outside of school grounds and grades would be evaluated using secular criteria.

Movsesian on Munoz on Original Meaning

Happy to report that my review of Phillip Munoz’s excellent new book on the original meaning of the religion clauses, Religious Liberty and the American Founding, is up on the website of the Journal of Law & Religion (Cambridge). Munoz persuasively argues that the Framers disagreed on precisely what the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment protect, apart from the freedom to worship. And, I argue, that’s why original meaning can’t provide closure on many of our debates about religious liberty today.

Here’s an excerpt:

Religious Liberty and the American Founding is a pleasure to read. Muñoz writes well and exceptionally clearly, and his book will appeal both to the educated public and to constitutional lawyers and scholars who spend their time immersed in doctrinal debates. He offers a wealth of detail on the drafting and ratification of the religion clauses. And the story he tells is a persuasive one. History is argument without end, but Muñoz’s basic point that the framers disagreed on the precise meaning of establishment and free exercise in the First Amendment but understood those terms in light of their background conception of religious liberty seems entirely plausible. Precisely because the framers could not agree on what the natural right of religious liberty itself entailed with respect to specific government policies, though, it is not clear how helpful a natural-rights construction of original meaning can be in resolving specific constitutional disputes.

A New Collection on Human Dignity

In this week’s Scholarship Roundup, I’m delighted to note a book edited by three friends: Brett Scharffs (BYU), Andrea Pin (Padua) and Dmytro Vovk (Yeshiva): Human Dignity, Judicial Reasoning, and the Law: Comparative Perspectives on a Key Constitutional Concept. “Human dignity” is something human rights law endorses in principle–pretty much everyone agrees about that. But legal cultures define human dignity quite differently, and the consensus can quickly fall apart when one starts to talk about concrete cases. Comparative work is necessary if we are to understand what judges, lawyers, and religious leaders mean when they say they are committed to human dignity. This new new book, from Routledge, is thus very welcome. Congratulations to Brett, Andrea, and Dmytro!

Here’s the description from the Routledge website:

This volume explores how national and international human rights courts interpret and apply human dignity. The book tracks the increasing deployment of the concept of human dignity within courts in recent decades. It identifies how human-dignity-based arguments have expanded to cover larger sets of cases: from the right to life or the right to integrity or anti-discrimination, the concept has surfaced in disputes about political and social rights and rule of law requirements, such as equality or legal certainty. The core message of the book is that judges understand, interpret, and apply human dignity differently. An inflation in the judicial recourse to human dignity can saturate the legal environment, depriving the concepts as well as human-rights-based narratives of salience, and threaten the predictability of court decisions. The book will appeal to philosophers of law, constitutional theorists and lawyers, legal comparativists, and international law specialists. While being dedicated specifically to human dignity jurisprudence, the book touches on many aspects of judiciary and as such will also be of interest to researchers studying legal reasoning, interpretation and application of the law and courts, as well as social philosophers, political scientists, and sociologists of law, politics, and religion.