In the latest edition of the Journal of Law and Religion, I review Phillip Munoz’s excellent new book on the Religion Clauses, Religious Liberty and the American Founding. In the book, Phillip undertakes to show, to the extent one can, the original meaning of the First Amendment’s Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses. That showing is elusive, he says, since “free exercise” and “establishment” didn’t have a clear meaning at the time of the Framing. Nonetheless, he argues that one can construct plausible meanings for these terms by focusing on the Framers’ understanding of religious liberty as a natural right.

For my take on Phillip’s argument, please read my review essay, linked below. Here’s a sample:

Religious Liberty and the American Founding is a pleasure to read. Muñoz writes well and exceptionally clearly, and his book will appeal both to the educated public and to constitutional lawyers and scholars who spend their time immersed in doctrinal debates. He offers a wealth of detail on the drafting and ratification of the religion clauses. And the story he tells is a persuasive one. History is argument without end, but Muñoz’s basic point that the framers disagreed on the precise meaning of establishment and free exercise in the First Amendment but understood those terms in light of their background conception of religious liberty seems entirely plausible. Precisely because the framers could not agree on what the natural right of religious liberty itself entailed with respect to specific government policies, though, it is not clear how helpful a natural-rights construction of original meaning can be in resolving specific constitutional disputes.