The Program on Church, State & Society at Notre Dame Law School announced a writing competition for law students focused on scholarship related to the intersection of church, state & society, and in particular how the law structures and governs that intersection.
Papers should be focused, broadly, on topics related to church, state & society. Papers must be between 9,000-13,000 words, including footnotes and/or endnotes. Papers should be double spaced and use Bluebook citation rules. Papers must be submitted by March 1st, 2022.
First Place, $3,000 cash award; Second Place, $2,000 cash award; Third Place, $1,000 cash award; Honorable Mention awards of $500.
I have a little review essay just published by the American Journal of Jurisprudence with this title (Graham Greene, apologies) reviewing Professor Joel Harrison’s recent book, Post-Liberal Religious Liberty: Forming Communities of Charity (CUP 2020). A portion:
“[A]s Joel Harrison observes in his new book, the price extracted from traditional religion for these thawing relations with liberalism was steep. First, the substratum of Christian culture and historical connection with Western nations had to be systematically stripped away to clear a path for the new civil religion of the liberal regime—as Harrison says, a new “true religion” of the modern civic sphere to replace the old one. (24) Second, because traditional religion was always perceived as a threat to the liberal egalitarian political order, it was expanded by that order to encompass an increasing range of phenomena connected to one of liberalism’s own master commitments, individual autonomy. Religion was in this way at once domesticated and subsumed by liberalism, “contained” and trivialized by hypertrophy. (55) Institutional religion, Harrison continues, was “flattened” to what liberalism regards as the most basic constituent fragment, the individual believer. (55) Third, this new capaciousness had the effect of subjecting religion to an assortment of balancing tests at law, in which religion’s importance was perpetually weighed against sundry other quotidian interests. Religion was reduced to one more consideration, no more intrinsically weighty than any other, that the liberal authority could horse-trade and dole out as it pleased. Fourth, it was deemed out of order for government officials and even ordinary citizens to make public appeals to religious authority as a transcendent source of meaning and worth in the activities of the polity. These claims instead had to be translated into the “secular” argot of liberal commitments—“reconceived as just like any other claim of ethical freedom”—to gain admission to the liberal courts of law and politics. (11) If they could not be, they were cordoned off to the “private” sphere. (13)”