Posted on by Marc O. DeGirolami

New York Court Dismisses Breach of Contract Suit Under Ministerial Exception

In New York’s first application (and extension) of Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC, a state court has dismissed a wrongful termination law suit filed by an ordained minister of the United States Methodist Church and a former employee of the General Commission on Christian Unity and Interreligious Concerns (GCCUIC), an arm of the Church devoted to ecumenical work.  The Book of Discipline of the Methodist Church set out the plaintiff’s job responsibilities, which included interfaith dialogue as well as proselytism.  It also stated that those in the plaintiff’s position:

shall be persons who model themselves after the servanthood of Jesus Christ. They shall be persons of genuine Christian character who love the Church and are committed to the oneness of the body of Christ, are morally disciplined and shall uphold the doctrinal and ethical standards of The United Methodist Church as set forth in the Doctrinal Standards and Social Principles, and are competent to administer the affairs of a general agency[.]

The plaintiff was fired, it seems, after a falling out with his superior.  He claimed that he was wrongfully terminated and that Hosanna-Tabor did not apply because his job was secular.  Though the court recognized that Hosanna-Tabor did not extend to breach of contract or tort actions, it disagreed.  Here is a good chunk of the court’s thorough analysis, which engages in very much the sort of particularist methodology laid out in Hosanna-Tabor as necessary to understand the nature of the employee’s position:

Unlike Hosanna-Tabor, it is undisputed that Mills is an ordained minister. He has several years of religious education and held ministerial positions before and after his employment with the GCCUIC. Pursuant to Hosanna-Tabor, the fact of his ordination is relevant to this inquiry. Nonetheless, Mills argues that the ministerial exception does not apply because his job duties with the GCCUIC were wholly secular. For the following reasons, this Court disagrees.

In Hosanna-Tabor, the Court noted it was relevant that “significant religious training and a recognized religious mission underlie the description of the employee’s position” (id. at 708). The GCCUIC required candidates for the Associate General Secretary position be “persons who model themselves after the servanthood of Jesus Christ” with a masters level education in theology, experience with ecumenism and interfaith relations, and “[t]heological acumen.” Therefore, it is evident that the position requires “significant religious training.”

As to whether “a recognized religious mission underlie[s] the description of the employee’s position,” the record indicates that the focus of the Associate General Secretary position is to “promote and further theological dialogue with other Christian Communications and interfaith partners” and to promote the purposes of the GCCUIC. Mills characterizes the purposes of the GCCUIC as “to advocate and work toward the full reception of the gift of Christian unity and to strengthen relationships with other living faith [sic] and to dialogue with persons of other faiths, cultures and ideologies” (Opp. Mem. at 2-3).2 Despite Mills’ arguments to the contrary, these are clearly religious purposes and a “recognized religious mission” underlies his job description.

Similar to the manner in which Hosanna-Tabor “held Perich out” as a minister, the GCCUIC held Mills out as a minister by classifying him as a ministerial employee and designating him as a clergyperson assigned to an “extension ministry.” Mills held himself out as a minister by claiming the housing tax exemption and presenting himself as a minister while conducting official GCCUIC business, and by wearing his collar and ministerial attire during business travel.

Pursuant to Hosanna-Tabor, even if Mills performed primarily secular duties, the ministerial exception will apply if his job duties “reflected a role in conveying the Church’s message and carrying out its mission.” The record indicates that Mills acted as a representative of the GCCUIC and The Methodist Church by participating in ecumenical dialogues with a variety of interfaith organizations and ministries where he “articulat[ed],” communicated, and interpreted the “perspectives positions, traditions” and the history of The United Methodist Church. During the course of his employment, he also wrote and published a variety of ecumenical writings and presentations which he touted as professional accomplishments in at least one performance review with the GCCUIC. On at least one occasion, he performed ministerial duties when he “preach[ed] during the Week of Prayer for Christian Unity.” Given all of these factors, it is clear that Mills had a role in conveying the Church’s message and carrying out its mission.”

Furthermore, adjudication of Mills’ claims would require this Court to interpret various sections of the Book of Discipline, a constitutionally questionable endeavor at best, given the religious nature of the text. Specifically, this Court would be obliged to examine Mills’ behavior and determine whether his termination was justified under paragraph 711 of the Book of Discipline which enumerates reasons that an Associate General Secretary may be terminated. Because New York law does not have legal standards for “immoral conduct” or “breach of trust,” there is no basis in law for this Court to determine whether Mills violated these provisions.

The case is Mills v. Standing General Commission on Christian Unity (No. 601640/2009, Jan. 29, 2013).

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Schieber, Conway, and McCarthy, “Where Justice and Mercy Meet”

Where Justice and Mercy MeetThis February, Liturgical Press will publish Where Justice and Mercy Meet (2013) edited by Vicki Schieber (Catholic Mobilizing Network), Trudy D. Conway (Mount St. Mary’s University), and David Matzko McCarthy (Mount St. Mary’s University). The publisher’s description follows.

 Where Justice and Mercy Meet: Catholic Opposition to the Death Penalty comprehensively explores the Catholic stance against capital punishment in new and important ways. The broad perspective of this book has been shaped in conversation with the Catholic Mobilizing Network to End the Use of the Death Penalty, as well as through the witness of family members of murder victims and the spiritual advisors of condemned inmates.

 The book offers the reader new insight into the debates about capital punishment; provides revealing, and sometimes surprising, information about methods of execution; and explores national and international trends and movements related to the death penalty. It also addresses how the death penalty has been intertwined with racism, the high percentage of the mentally disabled on death row, and how the death penalty disproportionately affects the poor.

 The foundation for the church’s position on the death penalty is illuminated by discussion of the life and death of Jesus, Scripture, the Mass, the Catechism of the Catholic Church, and the teachings of Pope John Paul II. Written for concerned Catholics and other interested readers, the book contains contemporary stories and examples, as well as discussion questions to engage groups in exploring complex issues.

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Bhuta on Religious Freedom in the European Court of Human Rights

Nehal Bhuta (European University Institute) has posted Two Concepts of Religious Freedom in the European Court of Human Rights. The abstract follows.

This paper considers the way in which recent historical work on the history of freedom of religion and freedom of conscience opens up a new interpretation of the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights in the headscarf cases. These decisions have been widely criticized as adopting a militantly secularist approach to the presence of Islamic religious symbols in the public sphere, an approach that seems inconsistent or even overtly discriminatory in light of the court’s recent decision in Lautsi that the compulsory display of crucifixes in the classroom did not breach Italy’s convention obligations. I argue that the headscarf cases turn less on the balance between state neutrality and religious belief, than on an understanding of certain religious symbols as a threat to public order and as harbingers of sectarian strife which undermine democracy.