Christian Growth and Persecution

A short editorial in The Economist on the subject.  Here’s a bit that I found somewhat perplexing:

Compared both with the wars of religion that once tore Christendom apart and with various modern intra-faith struggles, such as those within Islam, little blood is being spilt. But the brutality matters. Even if Western powers no longer see promoting Christianity’s interests as a geopolitical priority, it is hard to imagine American evangelicals ignoring a full-scale clampdown on house churches in China. And whatever their own beliefs, Western voters have other reasons to worry about the fate of Christians. Regimes or societies that persecute Christians tend to oppress other minorities too. Sunni Muslims who demonise Christians loathe Shias. Once religion is involved, any conflict becomes harder to solve.

This makes it sound as if under ordinary circumstances, “Western voters” would not care very much about Christian persecution, but they ought to care for instrumental reasons — because Christian persecution often goes hand in hand with religious persecution of other groups.  Why would “Western voters” care more about the persecution of “other minorities” than persecution of Christians?  I should think that “Western voters” would be concerned about religious persecution irrespective of the group being persecuted — not for any ulterior motive but because religious persecution is an evil.  Indeed, one might even think that “Western voters” might care very much about persecution of Christians in particular — even if the “Western voters” that the editorial is talking about are not, or are no longer, Christians.  Western culture — in its laws, in its ethics, and in countless other ways — is heavily indebted to Christianity.  Why shouldn’t the persecution of Christians be of special concern to “Western voters”?  And what does it mean to say that “any” conflict becomes harder to “solve” once religion is involved?  Conflicts can be intractable for any number of reasons, many of which have little or nothing to do with religion.  Whether a conflict involving religion is harder to “solve” than “any” other conflict will depend on the particular conflict that we are talking about, won’t it?

Classic Revisited: Tocqueville’s “Democracy in America”

This one will be familiar to many CLR Forum readers, but I was reminded of Alexis de Tocqueville’s wonderful work of comparative political science, Democracy in America (1835 & 1840) (readable in its entirety for free, people, for free!)  as I was preparing for my constitutional law class this spring.  Rather than reproducing the well-known tracts about American “democratic” religion, here’s a fragment from Tocqueville’s superb discussion of the unique position of the American federal judiciary.  Note in particular Tocqueville’s emphasis toward the end of the section I’ve reproduced on the fact that the American judge does not deal in “theoretical generalities,” but in very discrete factual particulars.  A proto-minimalist passage, perhaps.  From Volume I:

The first characteristic of judicial power in all nations is the duty of arbitration. But rights must be contested in order to warrant the interference of a tribunal; and an action must be brought before the decision of a judge can be had. As long, therefore, as a law is uncontested, the judicial authority is not called upon to discuss it, and it may exist without being perceived. When a judge in a given case attacks a law relating to that case, he extends the circle of his customary duties, without, however, stepping beyond it, since he is in some measure obliged to decide upon the law in order to decide the case. But if he pronounces upon a law without proceeding from a case, he clearly steps beyond his sphere and invades that of the legislative authority.

The second characteristic of judicial power is that it pronounces on special cases, and not upon general principles. If a judge, in deciding a particular point, destroys a general principle by passing a judgment which tends to reject all the inferences from that principle, and consequently to annul it, he remains within the ordinary limits of his functions. But if he directly attacks a general principle without having a particular case in view, he leaves the circle in which all nations have agreed to confine his authority; he assumes a more important and perhaps a more useful influence than that of the magistrate, but he ceases to represent the judicial power.

The third characteristic of the judicial power is that it can act only when it is called upon, or when, in legal phrase, it has taken cognizance of an affair. This characteristic is less general than the other two; but, notwithstanding the exceptions, I think it may be regarded as essential. The judicial power is, by its nature, devoid of action; it must be put in motion in order to produce a result. When it is called upon to repress a crime, it punishes the criminal; when a wrong is to be redressed, it is ready to redress it; when an act requires interpretation, it is prepared to interpret it; but it does not pursue criminals, hunt out wrongs, or examine evidence of its own accord. A judicial functionary who should take the initiative and usurp the censureship of the laws would in some measure do violence to the passive nature of his authority.

The Americans have retained these three distinguishing characteristics of the judicial power: an American judge can pronounce a decision only when litigation has arisen, he is conversant only with special cases, and he cannot act until the cause has been duly brought before the court. His position is therefore exactly the same as that of the magistrates of other nations, and yet he is invested with immense political power. How does this come about? If the sphere of his authority and his means of action are the same as those of other judges, whence does he derive a power which they do not possess? The cause of this difference lies in the simple fact that the Americans have acknowledged the right of judges to found their decisions on the Constitution rather than on the laws. In other words, they have permitted them not to apply such laws as may appear to them to be unconstitutional.

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Lecture at Fordham Law

Fordham’s Institute on Religion, Law, and Lawyer’s Work will host a lecture on January 24  by Archbishop Timothy Dolan as part of its “Law & the Gospel of Life” series. Archbishop Dolan will discuss bioethics. Details are here.

Call for Papers: Emerging Voices in Islamic Jurisprudence

The Journal of Law and Religion (Hamline) has issued a call for papers for an upcoming conference, “Emerging Voices in Islamic Jurisprudence.” Information is here.