Paris Bans Prayer in Streets

Here’s an under-reported story: starting this month, Paris has banned praying in the streets. The ban apparently results from concerns about crowds routinely overflowing mosques and blocking traffic during Friday prayers. Surprisingly, from an American perspective, the  government is not justifying the ban as a neutral time, place, and manner restriction applicable to all public gatherings.  Rather, according to news reports, the government is justifying the ban as a necessary restriction on religious expression as such. Public prayer “hurts the sensitivities of many of our fellow citizens,” Interior Minister Claude Guéant is quoted as saying. “Praying in the street is not dignified for religious practice and violates the principles of secularism.” The Minister vows that force will be used on Muslims — and adherents of other faiths — who violate the new rule.

I wonder whether the Minister is being quoted out of context. Although it’s certainly reasonable to keep the streets clear, it doesn’t seem reasonable to single out religious gatherings in particular. And, notwithstanding the Minister’s comments, I’m not sure that French secularism, or laïcité, requires such a ban. Laïcité is a complex concept, but both the Conseil d’État and the Conseil Constitutionnel have indicated that, as a legal matter, laïcité does not generally require bans on public religious expression. (For helpful discussions of laïcité as a legal concept, see CLR’s recent symposium, Laïcité in Comparative Perspective, in the Journal of Catholic Legal Studies). Wouldn’t it have made more sense to ban all crowds that block public streets without a permit? One irony: notwithstanding the concern for secularism, the government is allowing one large Muslim congregation that was blocking the streets to use a public fire station for prayers until the congregation can build a bigger mosque. — MLM

Gaudreault-DesBiens on Religious Expression

Jean-François Gaudreault-DesBiens (University of Montreal) has posted a new piece, Religion, Expression, and Freedom: Offense as a Weak Reason for Legal Regulation (in French).  The abstract follows.  — MLM

Some forms of religious expression tend to stir controversy among citizens who share a secular conception of public morality, whether or not they are themselves religious in the ‘private sphere.’ As well, religious individuals are often shocked by expression criticizing their beliefs or desacralizing the religious figures that they worship.

This paper examines some difficult questions raised by the interplay of freedom of expression and freedom of religion. Drawing on Raymond Boudon’s distinction between strong and good reasons, it offers a reflection on the quality of reasons invoked in support of claims demanding the censorship of either public manifestations of religious belief or anti-religious expression, observing that several of them, being neither strong nor good, are more often than not rather weak. It defends the thesis that the equilibrium between the two freedoms cannot be judged in the abstract but must instead be resituated within the particular historical and legal context within which it is established. However, it warns against the creation of double standards between religious expression and anti-religious expression, arguing that if the former is strongly protected, the other should be protected as strongly, irrespective of believers’ offended sensitivities. Secular moralities are no more, but no less, important, than religious ones.