Posted on by L&R Forum

Around the Web

Here are some important law-and-religion news stories from around the web:

  • Last year, the U.S. Supreme Court held in 303 Creative LLC v. Elenis that the First Amendment prohibits Colorado from requiring a wedding website designer to design websites for same-sex weddings in violation of her religious beliefs. On remand, 303 Creative LLC v. Elenis, the District of Colorado entered a final order in the case in favor of the designer.
  • The Department of Justice filed suit in federal court seeking to enjoin the California Department of Corrections from requiring Muslim and Sikh officers to be clean shaven so that they can properly wear tight-fitting respirators. The complaint argues that wearing a beard is a sincerely held religious belief and that the Department of Corrections has not made an effort to accommodate the officers by, for example, placing them in positions that do not require use of respirators or offering alternative respirators that fit over beards. 
  • In St. Timothy’s Episcopal Church v. City of Brookings, a federal district court held that a zoning ordinance limiting the number of days a church can serve free meals to needy people violates RLUIPA. The church has been serving meals three to four times per week, but, in 2021, the city amended its zoning code to require a permit to continue serving meals and limited the service to two times per week.
  • In Shlomo Hyman v. Rosenbaum Yeshiva of North Jersey, the New Jersey Supreme Court heard oral arguments in a suit brought by a rabbi who was terminated by an Orthodox Jewish day school for allegedly engaging in inappropriate conduct with elementary school-aged female students. The rabbi alleged the investigation that led to his termination was a “sham” and that he had been defamed, while the day school argued that he could not sue the school because its decision to terminate him is covered under the ministerial exception.
  • In T.I. v. R.I., a New York state trial court held that it would recognize a couple’s religious marriage even though the marriage was later annulled by a religious tribunal. The husband claimed that after the annulment, the marriage no longer existed and sought to have the wife’s civil divorce action dismissed, but the court refused to do so.
  • In S.E. v. Edelstein, an Ohio state appellate court affirmed dismissal of a suit brought by an Orthodox Jewish wife alleging her father-in-law intentionally interfered with a Jewish-law marriage contract she had with her husband. The court found that the suit, although couched as an intentional interference with contract claim, essentially sought damages for alienation of affections and breach of promise to marry, and those claims were barred by Ohio law. 
Posted on by L&R Forum

Around the Web

Here are some important law-and-religion news stories from around the web:

  • In 303 Creative LLC v. Elenis, the United States Supreme Court held 6-3 that the 1st Amendment’s free speech clause prohibit Colorado from requiring that a website designer create websites for same-sex weddings contrary to her religious beliefs.
  • In Groff v. DeJoy, a religious accommodation case under Title VII, a unanimous Supreme Court clarified that “undue hardship” exists where “‘a burden is substantial in the overall context of an employer’s business.'”
  • In Fox v. Washington, the 6th Circuit held that the Michigan Department of Corrections must recognize “Christian Identity” as a religion for purposes of the Michigan prison system.
  • In Goldstein v. Hochul, a federal court in New York refused to issue a preliminary injunction in a challenge to New York’s 2022 Concealed Carry Improvement Act, which bans carrying firearms in “any place of worship or religious observation.”  The suit was filed by an Orthodox Jewish congregation, its president, and Jewish residents of New York who say that they have carried handguns for self-defense in synagogues.
  • In Doe v. Alpine School District, a federal court in Utah rejected claims by parents of a high school student that the school’s practice of giving students long periods of unsupervised time, during which the student had premarital sex with his girlfriend, violated their religious free exercise rights. The court found that although premarital sex is against the parents’ religious beliefs, the school did not coerce the student into violating the parents’ religious beliefs.
  • In Alulddin v. Alfartousi, an Arizona state appeals court held that civil courts can enforce an Islamic marriage contract’s dowry provision. The court found that in deciding the dowry provision was a valid premarital agreement, it did not violate the 1st Amendment’s free exercise clause.
  • In Foundation for the Advancement of Catholic Schools, Inc. v. The Most Reverend Leonard P. Blair, a Connecticut trial court held that “the constitutional bar on court jurisdiction over religious matters” required it to abstain from a suit over whether the Archbishop could appoint Board of Trustee members other than those recommended by the Governance Committee.
Posted on by Marc O. DeGirolami

St. John’s Colloquium in Law and Religion Hosts Robin Fretwell Wilson

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On Tuesday, February 16, St. John’s Law and Religion Colloquium welcomed Professor Robin Fretwell Wilson. Professor Wilson, who was instrumental in bringing about the so-called “Utah compromise,” gave a very interesting talk about proposals from various perspectives to privatize marriage. The paper, “Getting Government out of marriage” Post Obergefell: The Ill-Considered Consequences of Transforming the State’s Relationship to Marriage,” argued that that these proposals are unwise as a policy matter for a variety of reasons.

Posted on by Marc O. DeGirolami

Oman on Islamic Marriage Contracts and the Common Law

Nate Oman has posted a thoughtful piece, How to Judge Shari’a Contracts: A Guide to Islamic Marriage Agreements in American Courts.  The abstract follows.

This Article thus has two goals. The first is to show how the Muslim conception of marriage diverges from the Christian-influenced norms that dominate American law and society. Understanding this divergence provides a necessary background to Islamic mahr contracts. The second goal is to provide lawyers and judges with a doctrinal framework within our current law for analyzing these contracts and reaching sensible results in concrete cases.

The remainder of this Article will proceed as follows: Part II provides an introduction to Islamic law in general, and the law of marriage and divorce in particular, as well as some discussion of how these rules function in practice. Part III summarizes the way in which American courts have dealt with mahr contracts, showing how both husbands and wives seek to deploy arguments based on contract law, the law of premarital agreements, and constitutional law. Part IV provides a framework for analyzing mahr contracts. It argues that such contracts are best dealt with using traditional contract doctrines. Indeed, once the meaning of mahr contracts are properly understood, this Article argues that the common law of contracts is capable of dealing with potential problems presented by mahr contracts without any dramatic legal innovations.

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Spencer on the Mahr as Contract

Katherine Spencer (Harvard University) has posted Mahr as Contract: Internal Pluralism and External Perspectives. The abstract follows. —YAH

This paper examines the Islamic legal doctrine of mahr- an inherent component to the marriage contract. In the first part the principal aspects of the marriage contract are analyzed and the pluralism between Islamic schools and geo-political regimes are acknowledged. In the second part the ‘mahr’ itself is specifically considered, noting the difficulties for Western scholars in conceptualizing and categorizing a provision that has no equivalent in Judeo-Christian marriage. The third part looks at the ways in which US and UK courts have categorized the mahr as a contract, or a term within a contract and yet have reached different conclusions on its enforceability. This produces inconsistent and sometimes unfair results and begs the question whether the recognition of Islamic family law by ‘Western’ courts is inherently problematic. In the final section I attempt to answer some of those larger questions and conclude with the view that giving effect to mahr agreements as enforceable personal rights is judicially feasible – with the proviso however that in circumstances of profound unfairness and where contrary to public policy courts maintain the discretion to render such contracts unenforceable.