On the Oklahoma Charter School Decision

Earlier this week, in a much-watched case, the Oklahoma Supreme Court ruled that a charter school, St. Isidore of Seville, is unconstitutional under state and federal law. In a post at the Volokh site today, I argue that this ruling was probably correct. As a charter school, St. Isidore is a hybrid, a cross between a public and a private school, and that makes its legal position complicated. Here’s an excerpt:

It’s not quite as clear as the Oklahoma court makes it seem, but the decision is probably correct, at least respecting the federal constitutional claims. Legally speaking, St. Isidore is caught in a dilemma—a dilemma that its hybrid nature as a charter school creates. If St. Isidore qualifies as a public school, there’s an obvious Establishment Clause problem. St. Isidore argued that it shouldn’t be seen as a public school, but as an independent contractor. But the Oklahoma statute specifically provides that charter schools are “public.” And that’s not just a matter of form, but also substance. As a charter school, St. Isidore is funded entirely by the state, must take all students who apply, and must comply with curricular and other requirements that don’t apply to private schools.

On the other hand, if St. Isidore is a private actor, the US Supreme Court’s recent free exercise cases may not help it too much. In Carson and Espinoza, the Court ruled that the state cannot exclude private religious schools from tuition assistance programs simply because they are religious—that would violate the schools’ right to practice their religion. That seems correct to me. But in those cases, the Court stressed that public funds went to private schools through the filter of parental choice. Parents who received tuition assistance designated which schools would receive the money.

St. Isidore would be entirely free, by contrast, and Oklahoma would be funding the school directly. True, the amount of money St. Isidore would receive would depend, presumably, on the number of students it enrolled—and that would depend on parental choice. But the state is more in the foreground (and the parents more in the background) in this case than in either Carson or Espinoza, and it feels different, somehow.

You can read the whole post here.

Movsesian on Munoz on Original Meaning

Happy to report that my review of Phillip Munoz’s excellent new book on the original meaning of the religion clauses, Religious Liberty and the American Founding, is up on the website of the Journal of Law & Religion (Cambridge). Munoz persuasively argues that the Framers disagreed on precisely what the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment protect, apart from the freedom to worship. And, I argue, that’s why original meaning can’t provide closure on many of our debates about religious liberty today.

Here’s an excerpt:

Religious Liberty and the American Founding is a pleasure to read. Muñoz writes well and exceptionally clearly, and his book will appeal both to the educated public and to constitutional lawyers and scholars who spend their time immersed in doctrinal debates. He offers a wealth of detail on the drafting and ratification of the religion clauses. And the story he tells is a persuasive one. History is argument without end, but Muñoz’s basic point that the framers disagreed on the precise meaning of establishment and free exercise in the First Amendment but understood those terms in light of their background conception of religious liberty seems entirely plausible. Precisely because the framers could not agree on what the natural right of religious liberty itself entailed with respect to specific government policies, though, it is not clear how helpful a natural-rights construction of original meaning can be in resolving specific constitutional disputes.

Mattone Center’s Year-End Report

It’s been another productive academic year at the Mattone Center. The most important news, of course, is the transformational, multimillion dollar gift from Denise and Michael Mattone, for whom the Center is now named. We have also been busy with podcasts, blog posts, public events, faculty appearances, and writing. To read all about it, please check out our annual year-end report, below. Thanks!

On Tradition and Jack Balkin

At Law & Liberty today, I review Yale Law Professor Jack Balkin’s new book on tradition in constitutional law, Memory and Authority. Balkin makes some good points. He correctly describes how lawyers and judges use tradition in practice, and is right that the appeal of tradition–which is often multifarious and contested–depends on whether listeners feel connected to the past in the first place. But, I argue, Balkin’s definition of tradition is so elastic that it sometimes seems he isn’t talking about tradition at all:

For example, he praises Obergefell v. Hodges, which held that the Constitution confers a right to same-sex marriage, for its correct use of tradition. True, there is no “history of specific legal guarantees for same-sex marriage in American law.” But he argues that American tradition should be understood in a broader, more sensitive way, as a commitment to animating principles. The Obergefell Court correctly saw that the reasons why Americans historically have supported marriage generally obtained in the new context of same-sex marriage as well, and applied those reasons to reach a satisfactory present-day result. One can “alter or even reject existing practices,” he writes, “while being faithful to the country’s traditions of liberty.”

Now, one can praise or criticize the Court’s reasoning in Obergefell. But to paraphrase something Grant Gilmore said about Oliver Wendell Holmes in a different context, the magician who can traditionalize Obergefell can, the need arising, traditionalize anything. Tradition refers to concrete practices and accommodations that endure across time in a community, not abstractions like “liberty” or “equality” or “dignity” or “justice.” And one cannot plausibly claim that same-sex marriage is an American tradition in that sense. One must choose which traditions to follow and which to discard; that is the essence of modernity. But one cannot decide a case according to an abstract, indeterminate principle and call oneself a traditionalist. One may as well say that one is doing something new—that one is deciding a case based on one’s normative commitments and leave it at that.

You can read the review here.

A Video of This Month’s Panel on Kennedy v. Bremerton School District

For those who are interested, here’s a writeup of this month’s panel discussion on SCOTUS’s recent school-prayer case, Kennedy v. Bremerton School District, with panelists Stephanie Barclay (Notre Dame), Marc DiGirolami (CUA), and Mattone Center Director Mark Movsesian. Among the topics discussed: the end of the endorsement test, the meaning of the Court’s new history-and-tradition test, and the lingering problem of coercion. A video of the panel is below. Listen in!

Barclay and DeGirolami at St. John’s Next Week

I’m delighted to announce that next week the Center will welcome Stephanie Barclay (Notre Dame), and welcome back Marc DeGirolami (Catholic University), for a discussion of the recent school prayer case, Kennedy v. Bremerton School District (2022). Details about the event, which the Center will co-host with the St. John’s Journal of Catholic Legal Studies, are here (registration is required). Friends of the Center, drop by and say hello!

Making American Religion Moderate

At the Law & Liberty site this morning, I review a new documentary on the history of religious freedom in America, “Free Exercise.” The film shows how minority religious communities–Catholics, Mormons, and others–have changed America over time. But, I argue, America has changed minority religions as well. Here’s an excerpt:

ike the Quakers, who went from being bottle-breaking radicals to sober citizens, Catholics and Mormons themselves changed in ways that made them less threatening to the American majority. One major point of contention between the Catholic Church and the wider American society had to do with religious liberty itself. The nineteenth-century Church was the Church of the Syllabus of Errors (1864), a papal document that condemned freedom of conscience and the separation of church and state as dangerous heresies. America’s Protestant majority saw this document and the values it espoused as hostile to fundamental American commitments. In the 1928 campaign, The Atlantic published an open letter questioning whether a Catholic like Smith could serve as president, citing the Syllabus and other papal pronouncements on church and state.

A hundred years later, though, and largely through the efforts of American Catholics like Fr. John Courtney Murray, the Second Vatican Council adopted Dignitatis Humanae, a document that specifically endorses religious liberty as a civil right. Catholic scholars have argued that Dignitatis Humanae and the Syllabus of Errors can be interpreted consistently with one another and that, from a theological perspective, there was no change. However theologians understand the situation, though, after Dignitatis Humanae, something had indeed changed as a practical matter. A major point of tension between the Catholic Church and American culture had disappeared, largely because of American influence.

Or consider the LDS Church. A primary source of conflict between Mormons and the wider American society in the nineteenth century had to do with plural marriage, the issue in cases like Reynolds and Davis. In 1890, however, the LDS Church officially ended the practice—making it possible for Utah to be admitted as a state six years later. Practically speaking, Mormonism changed in a way that made it much less threatening to the wider American public. Mormons conformed to social convention, and relations between the LDS Church and other Americans have been better ever since.

What causes religions in America to move toward the mean over time? Some argue that the Lockean ideology that underlies our First Amendment is designed to encourage religious moderation—to minimize religious “enthusiasms” that threaten social peace. If that’s the case, Lockeanism certainly seems to be working. Or perhaps another factor explains things. Two hundred years ago, Tocqueville wrote about the strong pressures for social conformity that exist in the United States, where he observed “little independence of mind.” Whether as a result of ideology or social norms, or both, the pattern is apparent.

You can read the full essay here.

Spring 2024 Reading Group: Shakespeare’s “Measure for Measure”

I’m happy to announce the subject for this semester’s meeting of our Center’s Reading Group on Law and Religion: Shakespeare’s Measure for Measure. First performed 400 years ago, the play still has the capacity to shock. The questions it poses about political corruption, sexual harassment, and the relationship between law and religion remain relevant today, and the answers are just as elusive.

Please join us on March 26 to discuss this most problematic of Shakespeare’s “problem plays.” As always, we will provide copies of the book ahead of time, so registration is essential. Details are here.

Movsesian at Princeton Tomorrow

I’m looking forward to participating tomorrow in a film screening and panel discussion on the history of religious freedom in America at the James Madison Program at Princeton. Details above. Friends of the Forum, stop by and say hello!

Film Screening at Princeton Next Month

Next month at Princeton University, I’ll be participating in a film screening and panel discussion on religious liberty in the United States, “Free Exercise: America’s Story of Religious Liberty.” The event is sponsored by Princeton’s James Madison Program, where I spent a wonderful semester a few years ago. Details are available here. Friends of the Forum in the area, stop by and say hello!