Last November, the Mattone Center co-hosted a regional conference of the International Consortium for Law and Religion Studies. The conference, “Education, Religious Freedom, and State Neutrality,” brought together scholars and jurists from the United States and Europe to compare approaches to these subjects in their respective countries. Participants were invited to submit short reflections. Weronika Kudła (Pontifical University of John Paul II) submitted the following reflection, which we are delighted to publish here.
I. Religious Education in Public Schools: Lessons from Poland
In most EU countries religious education is present in public schools, often organized in cooperation with religious authorities and financed by the state. Only in four Member States—France (outside Alsace–Moselle), Slovenia, Luxembourg, and Bulgaria—religious instruction takes place outside the public school system. Thus, religious education is part of the public school system in 23 EU Member States. In eight countries, it is formally compulsory, although students may usually opt out at their parents’ request (only in Greece and Cyprus are Orthodox pupils required to attend). In fifteen EU countries, including Poland, participation in religion classes is voluntary and depends on a written declaration by parents or older students.
Against a European backdrop increasingly defined by secularism and framed as religious neutrality, Poland stands out as a predominantly Christian country, though some experts note that Poland seems to be the fastest secularizing country in the world. Recent social, political, and legal shifts make the Polish experience particularly noteworthy in discussions of religion in public education. While this post focuses on schooling, these debates unfold against a backdrop of broader cultural and religious changes in Poland, including declining engagement with the Catholic Church and shifting patterns of religiosity.
Religious education remains firmly embedded in the Polish public school system, yet it has become the focus of legal disputes, administrative interventions, and symbolic controversies. These conflicts reveal deeper constitutional tensions around religious freedom, state impartiality, and cooperation between public authorities and religious communities. Poland’s experience thus offers more than a national story: it functions as a test case, exposing how fragile carefully balanced legal arrangements can become amid political polarization and social anxiety.
II. Cooperation as a Cornerstone
Church–State relations in Poland are structured by four principles enshrined in Article 25 of the Constitution: 1) equality of churches and religious associations, 2) impartiality of public authorities, 3) mutual autonomy, and 4) cooperation for the good of the person and the common good. This model, often described as coordinated separation, rejects both hostility to religion on the one hand and confessional dominance of a single church recognized as the state church on the other. It is also common across Europe and shapes the model of religious education and the limits of freedom of religion or belief in schools.
Article 53 of the Constitution protects freedom of conscience and religion as a personal right rooted in human dignity and, in Article 53(4), explicitly permits churches and other recognized religious associations to provide religious instruction in public schools, provided that others’ freedom of religion or belief is not infringed.
Complementarily, the Preamble to the Education Law defines education as a common good and stipulates that teaching and upbringing—while respecting the Christian system of values—shall be based on universal principles of ethics. Respect for Christian values in the preamble does not convert education into a confessional enterprise; rather, it guides teleological interpretation in a system that is axiology-aware but constitutionally impartial, not secularist.
These principles are further specified and implemented by ordinary statutes. Religion classes are organized at the request of parents or pupils (after reaching the age of majority), attendance is optional, and students may choose religion, ethics, both, or neither. Curricula and textbooks are developed by religious communities, while teachers—although employed by public schools—require denominational authorization. Beyond the classroom, the law allows voluntary prayer, religious symbols, and participation in religious practices, provided that no coercion occurs. Normatively, the framework is coherent and balanced: it reconciles religious freedom, pluralism, and state impartiality through cooperation rather than exclusion. However, the Polish case demonstrates that strong constitutional principles only produce effective protection when paired with faithful implementation and political consensus; without it, polarization can undermine the practical exercise of rights.
III. Executive Regulation and the Breakdown of Cooperation
Between 2024 and 2025, the Ministry of National Education adopted a series of executive regulations that significantly altered the organization of religious education in public schools. Mixed inter-grade and inter-stage groups are now explicitly permitted. Grades from religion and ethics no longer appear on the school certificate nor are they counted toward the final grade average, following the Regulation of 22 March 2024. The weekly load of religious instruction has been reduced from two lessons to one lesson per week, without the need for prior consent of church authorities. This change, introduced by the Regulation of 17 January 2025, has been particularly criticized for infringing the principle of cooperation, since it was not preceded by the required consultation with religious associations.
Religious communities challenged the Ministry before the Constitutional Tribunal, arguing that the regulations not only affected organizational matters but also interfered with constitutionally protected autonomy and the institutional dimension of freedom of religion. The reasoning of the Constitutional Tribunal in case U 10/24 —which was subsequently reiterated in judgments U 11/24 and U 2/25 —was grounded in a consistent constitutional logic. The Tribunal held that the challenged regulation was unconstitutional in its entirety because it violated the consensual model of regulating Church–State relations guaranteed by Article 25(3) of the Constitution. By adopting executive measures concerning religious education without the agreement required by statutory law, the Ministry breached not only the cooperation principle, but also the principles of legality and the rule of law.
Importantly, the Tribunal emphasized that the disputed provisions went beyond technical organization. By enabling extensive inter-grade and inter-level aggregation of religion classes, the regulation interfered with parents’ constitutional right to ensure the moral and religious upbringing of their children in a manner appropriate to the child’s age and maturity (Article 53(3) in conjunction with Article 48(1) of the Constitution). It also undermined pupils’ right to education adapted to their developmental capacities, making it impossible to tailor religious instruction to differentiated curricula and pedagogical methods.
The Tribunal further found that these organizational changes conflicted with Poland’s international obligations under the Concordat with the Holy See, which guarantees that religious education in public schools is to be conducted in accordance with approved curricula. Finally, the regulation was held to violate the principle of protection of legitimate expectations and the constitutional protection of work, as its abrupt entry into force—following only a one-month vacatio legis—created a real and foreseeable risk of sudden job losses among religion teachers without adequate transitional safeguards. Taken together, the Tribunal’s reasoning confirms that the executive regulations did not merely adjust the framework of religious education, but structurally altered it in a manner incompatible with constitutional guarantees of cooperation, parental rights, legal certainty, and institutional autonomy.
However, these judgments were never published in the Journal of Laws and therefore did not acquire formal legal force (in March 2024, the Polish Parliament adopted a resolution addressing the effects of the 2015–2023 constitutional crisis concerning the Constitutional Tribunal, in which it declared that appointments of several Tribunal judges made between 2015 and 2018 were unconstitutional, that the office of the President of the Tribunal was held without proper authorization, and that numerous judgments are legally defective, a view echoed by the European Commission, which has questioned the Tribunal’s independence under Article 19 TEU).
As a consequence, regulations found to be unconstitutional continue to be applied in practice. Schools, parents, and teachers are left navigating a landscape of conflicting norms, where constitutional guarantees formally remain in place but lack effective protection. This situation exposes a deeper systemic problem. The non-implementation of constitutional judgments transforms freedom of religion in public education from a constitutionally secured right into a matter contingent on current governmental policy. In this way, religious freedom—designed to be shielded from political fluctuation through the mechanism of cooperation—becomes politicized. The Polish case thus demonstrates that even a carefully balanced constitutional framework may lose its normative force when institutional checks fail and political polarization undermines respect for constitutional adjudication.
IV. Legal Instability and Its Social Consequences for Religious Education
Legal instability coincides with rising social anxiety surrounding religion in public schools. For instance, in December 2025, a teacher at a primary school in Kielno allegedly removed a classroom cross and threw it into a trash bin after students refused to take it down themselves. The incident provoked immediate protests outside the school, involving local politicians, parents, and public figures, and attracted widespread media attention. Importantly, the prosecutor’s office opened an official investigation into the potential offense of offending students’ religious feelings, underscoring the legal significance of the act.
Authorities emphasized the sensitivity of the situation: the Minister of Education warned that religious symbols are being used politically, while local officials ensured psychological and pedagogical support for students and clarified the investigative process. The incident highlights the emotional weight of religious symbols in schools and illustrates how regulatory uncertainty can escalate localized classroom events into broader social and political conflict. It underscores the importance of clear legal guidance and faithful implementation of constitutional guarantees to reduce anxiety, prevent politicization of school life, and maintain trust in educational institutions.
Religion classes scheduled at marginal hours discourage participation and stigmatize both pupils and teachers, amounting to indirect discrimination. Inconsistent local decisions regarding religious symbols, prayers, or celebrations fragment constitutional standards and undermine equality. Polish education law remains largely silent on new educational spaces, such as online learning, where questions of religious expression and neutrality are increasingly pressing.
The lack of a specialized complaint mechanism leaves students, parents, and teachers dependent on general remedies, which are slow and ill-suited to resolve school-level disputes. In this environment, social anxiety magnifies conflicts, showing that constitutional guarantees require both legal clarity and practical mechanisms for their enforcement.
V. From Conflict to Constitutional Lessons
The Polish experience demonstrates that freedom of religion in education cannot be secured by legal text alone. Cooperation between the State and religious communities, faithful implementation of constitutional principles, and sensitivity to social and political dynamics are all essential. At its core, the current crisis is not about whether religion belongs in public schools. It is about how constitutional principles are implemented—and whether they are treated as binding norms or adjustable policy preferences. Poland’s Constitution provides clear answers: denominational teaching is lawful, voluntariness is essential, pluralism must be respected, and cooperation is obligatory. Experiences from recent controversies show that legal frameworks gain meaning only when embedded in a culture of dialogue, procedural transparency, and institutional accountability.
Poland’s experience offers a cautionary lesson for all societies committed to religious freedom: when constitutional guarantees are subject to political manipulation, even a majority faith can find itself under pressure, while minority perspectives can be leveraged to marginalize religion more broadly (see comparative analysis of religious expression in schools in Poland and the United States).
One constructive response would be the establishment of an independent ombudsman for religious freedom in education, tasked with promoting dialogue, fostering tolerance, and guiding administrators, teachers, and students in navigating religious diversity. By investing in education that respects both freedom of conscience and pluralism, societies can prevent the politicization of religious practice and cultivate inclusive, respectful learning environments.
What is at stake is constitutional culture. In the Polish constitutional order, neutrality is not equated with the exclusion of religion from the public sphere. Instead, it is conceived as positive impartiality: the state does not identify with any belief system, but it also does not suppress religious expression or treat it as inherently suspect. This distinction is central to understanding both the legal framework governing religious education in Poland and the controversies that have emerged around it. Neutrality achieved through exclusion breeds conflict, while neutrality grounded in cooperation fosters stability. These questions extend far beyond Poland. They go to the heart of democratic governance in pluralistic societies, reminding us that constitutional law ultimately lives not only in judgments and statutes, but in classrooms, school corridors, and everyday social practice.