Prompted by an inquiry from Rick Garnett, I took a look again at Jeffrie Murphy’s wonderful book, Getting Even: Forgiveness and Its Limits (2003), about which I’ve written a little before. Chapter Nine, entitled “Christianity and Criminal Punishment,” contains the following interesting passage about the relationship of Christianity and retribution. But I think it also says something useful about rehabilitation.
But what about retribution? Is it a legitimate objective on a Christian view of punishment? . . . . This depends, I think, on just what one means by “retribution.” In the philosophical literature on punishment, retributive punishment is usually understood as giving the criminal what he, in justice, deserves. There are, however, at least six different accounts of what might be meant by “desert” and thus at least six different versions of retributivism: desert as legal guilt; desert as involving mens rea (e.g., intention, knowledge); desert as involving responsibility (capacity to conform one’s conduct to the rules); desert as a debt owed to annul wrongful gains from unfair free riding (a view developed by Herbert Morris); desert as what the wrongdoer owes to vindicate the social worth of the victim (a view developed by Jean Hampton); and, finally, desert as involving ultimate character — evil or wickedness in some deep sense (a view that Kant calls “inner viciousness”) . . . .
It seems to me that there is no inconsistency between the essentials of Christianity and the first five forms of retribution noted. With respect to the sixth, however — what I will call “deep character retributivism” — there does seem to me to be an inconsistency . . . .